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Power, Privacy and Thermal Imaging
Susan Bandest
Given that this is a symposium about privacy and technol-
ogy, the first and most important point of my article is this: The
Fourth Amendment is not about privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment challenges posed by thermal imaging, Carnivore,
Magic Lantern, and the like are most usefully viewed, not as
problems caused by advancing technology, but as symptoms of
a deeper problem with modern Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. The first part of this statement echoes a central thesis
of Raymond Ku's article. Professor Ku asserts that the Fourth
Amendment is not about privacy but about governmental
power.' The government's power to intrude raises concerns
about privacy, but also about force and coercion, about indis-
criminate and discriminatory intrusions, and ultimately, about
the measure of our liberty. The Katz2 case may well have been
written in an effort to constrain government power and protect
individual liberty, but it has become increasingly a case about
privacy, and the transformation has, by and large, unleashed
governmental power at the expense of our liberty.
Professor Ku and I might part company somewhat, how-
ever, on the significance of technology to the debate about the
Fourth Amendment. Although he appears to view technology
as a challenge to pre-existing doctrinal understandings, and an
occasion to rethink them, I will argue that the doctrinal under-
standings deserve to be rethought quite apart from the advent
of technological advances.
To begin with our common ground, Professor Ku and I
agree that refocusing Fourth Amendment analysis from privacy
to governmental power would have a number of salutary ef-
1. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amend-
ment and the Power of Technological Surveillance After Kyllo, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1325 (2002).
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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fects. Ku notes that the "Supreme Court has transformed the
Fourth Amendment from a constitutional provision delineating
the scope of governmental power generally as determined by
the people into a provision that protects only isolated pockets of
interests as determined by judges."3 I will return later to his
position that the people (by which he means juries and perhaps
legislatures) should determine the scope of these protections.
For now, my focus is on his astute observation that current doc-
trine creates isolated pockets of interest. Current doctrine is
atomistic rather than holistic; focused on defining the pockets
of privacy each of us is permitted to keep from the govern-
ment's prying eye, rather than on creating and enforcing an ef-
fective web of constraints against encroaching government
power. This difference in focus has crucial implications.
The question of whether particular government conduct
amounts to a search is the threshold question determining
whether the Fourth Amendment will provide any constraint at
all. The Katz test acts as an on-off switch, and when it is off,
the governmental conduct is subject, not to lesser constitutional
protection, but to no protection at all. When the switch is on, it
triggers the (alleged) per se rule in favor of warrants, as well as
the exclusionary rule. Commentators have noted the problem
of having such dramatic consequences riding on a single ques-
tion,4 and of placing judges in the unpleasant and risky position
of having to exclude evidence of crime, and possibly letting
"[tihe criminal.., go free."5 Thus, as Justice Scalia seems to
suggest in Kyllo, the Katz test has become a way to avoid what
are perceived to be the onerous effects of the warrant require-
ment.6
It is arguable that Katz did not start out as a tool for avoid-
ing the warrant requirement-quite the contrary.7 Its increas-
ing focus on the legitimacy of the complainants' expectations
and on the fictional notion of assumption of risk,8 however, has
3. Ku, supra note 1, at 1357.
4. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 388 (1974).
5. "[Blecause the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 150 N.E.
585, 587 (1926) (Justice (then Judge) Cardozo's famous criticism of the rule).
6. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-39 (2001).
7. See Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 383-86.
8. The articles presented by Professors Swire, Schwartz, and Janger il-
lustrated well the difficulties for the populace inherent in understanding the
nature of the risks we assume, and in choosing not to assume them. See Ed-
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transformed it into just such an implement. Excluding
searches from the reach of the Fourth Amendment is made eas-
ier when the interests invaded are portrayed as individualistic.
Fourth Amendment standing doctrine, which the Court has de-
clared to be a subspecies of "search" doctrine,9 illustrates the
atomistic nature of search doctrine and its consequences. It not
only declares the Fourth Amendment interests at stake to be
personal to the defendant asserting them, but portrays the in-
terests possessed as narrowly as possible.10 Fourth Amend-
ment standing doctrine rejects the available model from Article
III standing doctrine, which sometimes permits standing based
on the importance of the principle and the recognition that it
affects others besides the individual litigant.1 Indeed, it is in-
consistent with the model on which the exclusionary rule is
based, which views the Fourth Amendment not as a personal
right but as a broad constraining principle. Unfortunately, if a
litigant cannot establish standing to challenge the validity of a
search, the exclusionary rule does him little good.
Standing doctrine permits law enforcement agents to en-
gage in conduct that would be illegal if certain litigants com-
plained about it, so long as it directs it at those without the
right to complain. In the Court's metaphysically challenging
parlance, the conduct is "not a search"12 as to certain persons,
though it is as to others. Standing law encourages even
searches of homes that invade the privacy of homeowners, so
long as it is the visitor, not the homeowner, who is caught with
contraband.' 3 Even intentional police misconduct like the theft
ward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Informa-
tion Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (2002);
Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86
MINN. L. REv. 1263 (2002).
9. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
10. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980); Rakas, 439 U.S.
at 133-40; John M. Burkoff, When is a Search Not a "Search"? Fourth Amend-
ment Doublethink, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 515, 532-38 (1984) (discussing
Rawlings).
11. See, for example, the third party standing cases, such as Doe v. Bol-
ton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 227, 265-70 (1990) (discussing alternative models of Article III stand-
ing).
12. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 129-38.
13. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-91 (1998) (denying standing
to a casual visitor to a home); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-20
(1981) (holding a search warrant is needed to enter the premises of a third
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of private papers (while the owner was distracted by a govern-
mentally supplied prostitute) at issue in the Payner14 case was
not considered a search, because, as the government well knew,
the parties with the requisite interests had no incentive to
complain about it and the parties with the incentive lacked the
requisite interests. A Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that
took seriously the notions of providing advance guidance to po-
lice, or deterring police overreaching, would not countenance
such results.
The inadequacies of the atomistic approach to restraining
police conduct are not solely a feature of Fourth Amendment
doctrine. Part of the reason why the chasm between searches
and non-searches is so vast is that there is no constitutional
safety net. The Court says it is the job of the Fourth Amend-
ment to protect privacy and not, for example, equality. The
unholy trinity of United States v. Robinson, 15 Whren v. United
States,16 and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista17 permits custodial
arrests and full body searches as long as police have probable
cause to believe that any crime, even a minor traffic violation,
has been committed, even if the officer has singled out the ar-
restee based on pernicious criteria. The Court finds this prob-
lem to reside, if anywhere, in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection clause, but has simultaneously erected daunt-
ing barriers to proof of discriminatory arrest under the Four-
teenth Amendment.' 8 A more holistic jurisprudence focused on
constraining governmental power might seek to avoid creating
a chasm between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
leaving so much police overreaching and abuse of discretion un-
constrained.
Notice that the sorts of objectionable governmental conduct
I just described-stealing a briefcase, entering a home without
a warrant, singling out a suspect based on race, class, or other
pernicious factors-have nothing high-tech about them. One
concern about Kyllo, and about Professor Ku's arguments in fa-
party); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 (1980) (holding an arrest
warrant is needed to arrest a suspect in his own home).
14. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980).
15. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
16. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
17. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461-71 (1996)
(creating difficult hurdles for a claim of selective prosecution).
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vor of Kyllo's approach, stems from the importance they place
in addressing technological developments. Certainly, technol-
ogy poses a challenge for the Katz test. As one commentator
put it, "[N]ew technologies alter individuals' privacy expecta-
tions and encroach upon realms for which society has yet to de-
velop such expectations. .".."19 On a more basic level, techno-
logical advances pose the challenges that always beset the
constitutional enterprise-those involved with trying to create
fixed rules, or at least a workable rule of law, for a changing
world. In this regard, technology illustrates the problem with
trying to rely on fixed understandings of how the world works.
For example, it vividly illustrates the problem with relying on
Framers' intent in an overly particularized fashion; with con-
sidering not just the values underlying the Fourth Amendment
but the particular concerns and expectations of the Framers'
historical time.20
My concern is with Ku's assertion that the use of emerging
technologies is "an altogether different inquiry" from that per-
taining to what he calls physical searches, and generally, that
the difficulty with Fourth Amendment doctrine can be attrib-
uted "especially to surveillance technologies."21 Ku seemingly
argues for some form of step-by-step authorization for each new
technological advance that invades the sphere of liberty.22 Ul-
timately, my concern is that any solution addressed especially
to the problems raised by technology, such as viewing the use of
new technology as requiring special justification, will be a step
in the wrong direction.
There are several concerns with such an approach. First,
the harm flowing from the Court's treatment of technological
advances predates, or at any rate exists independent of, those
advances. For example, consider the use of police spies. Cases
like Lopez v. United States,23 Lewis v. United States,24 and
Hoffa v. United States,25 all pre-Katz cases whose holdings have
19. The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV.
306, 346 (2001).
20. See Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 401.
21. Ku, supra note 1, at 1331.
22. See id. at 1362-67.
23. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
24. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
25. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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been held to survive Katz,26 made a number of leaps in logic
that bear much of the blame for our current sorry doctrinal
state. These cases used an amalgam of expectation of privacy
analysis and assumption of risk analysis to conclude, first, that
betrayal by those we trust is a recognized risk of social interac-
tion. This proposition is unremarkable, but the Court takes
two important and questionable steps. First, it conflates the
risk of perfidious friends with the risk of spies sent by the gov-
ernment. Tony Amsterdam had the classic response to this
conflation. He observed the Court's "unworldly" and all-or-
nothing notion of privacy:
The difference between the risk of faithlessness that we all run when
we choose our friends and the risk of faithlessness that we run when
government foists a multiplying army of bribed informers on us may
well be a matter of degree; but of such degrees is liberty or its de-
struction engineered.
2 7
The question, however, is not just about the magnitude of
the risk. As Amsterdam emphasizes, it is, most crucially, about
the source of the risk. As he also famously asks, does the fact
that junkies are likely to break into my car in Greenwich Vil-
lage mean that the police may also do so?28 The Fourth
Amendment is not concerned with whether our friends betray
us; it is concerned with constraining abuse of our rights by
agents of the government. The assumption of risk test, as Jus-
tice Marshall said in his dissent in Smith v. Maryland,29 allows
the government to inform us of what risks we have assumed,
what expectations it deems reasonable for us to hold.30 As
Chris Slobogin ably demonstrated, the Court's application of
the assumption of risk test has generally contradicted any set-
tled expectations that can be empirically measured.31 The
question should not be what we are permitted to expect, but
rather, whether the police activity is consistent with the aims
26. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
27. Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 407.
28. Id. at 406-07.
29. See 442 U.S. 735, 749-51 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. See also Burkoff, supra note 10, at 537-41 (discussing the Court's "Or-
wellian doublethink").
31. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expecta-
tions of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical
Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 Duke L.J.
727, 774 (1993).
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of a free and open society.32 Perhaps we might conclude that
police spies meet this standard, and perhaps, as Tracy Maclin
has persuasively argued, 33 we might not. But the question
needs to be asked, not assumed away.34
The second step that cases like On Lee,35 Lewis, and Hoffa
take is to permit the government spies who have covertly en-
tered the suspect's home or workplace or confidence to wear
wires or tape recorders, reasoning that this use of technology
simply enhances the reliability of the agent's observation.
36
Tracey Maclin has it exactly right when he argues that, in the
police spy cases, although the enhancement is a "'circum-
stance[ of aggravation,"' the crux of the harm is the original
act of surreptitious surveillance by the police.37 The real prob-
lem here is not the leap from covert action to technological en-
hancement, but the conflation of private and public action.
I do not mean to defend the leap from the unaided senses
to technological enhancement. The disingenuousness and "oth-
erworldliness" of saying "we are merely making our observation
more accurate" is problematic. Just as there is a difference in
kind between disloyal friends and government spies, there is
often a difference in kind between naked eye observation and
enhanced observation. The Kyllo opinion should be lauded for
its recognition of this point, if only in the context of a home.
Kyllo rejected the proposition that the use of thermal imaging
technology is no different in kind from watching the snow melt
on a home and observing that it melts more quickly in some
places than in others. 38
32. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Amsterdam for
the proposition that the inquiry depends on whether the surveillance would
diminish privacy and freedom inconsistent with the aims of a free and open
society).
33. See generally Tracey Maclin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment:
A Reconsideration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 573 (1996) (arguing that the Court's in-
terpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which sanctions the government's au-
thority to use secret spies and informants, is misguided).
34. See id. at 623 (calling the assumption of risk test "a legal conclusion
masquerading as legal analysis"); see also Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 406
(calling it "wildly beside the point").
35. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
36. See, e.g., id. at 753-54.
37. Maclin, supra note 33, at 601 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886)) (citation omitted).
38. Kylo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 43 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
2002] 1385
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But why is it different, and will that difference melt away
when thermal imaging technology is within reach of the aver-
age citizen? The difference is, in part, that police are using
technology that is either unavailable or rarely available to the
average citizen, and that therefore the equation with naked eye
observation, or plain view, is simply inapposite. In reality, the
average citizen would be unlikely to take comparative heat
waste measurements, or obtain Carnivore to search vast stores
of e-mail correspondence.3 9 It is not that difficult to rent a heli-
copter, I suppose, if one wants to hover over a neighbor's back-
yard at 500 feet, and soon we should be able to purchase ther-
mal imaging technology at Best Buy. Ought the entry of the
technology into general use convert the police activity into one
the Fourth Amendment should not reach? At bottom, this is a
prescriptive issue, one that needs to be faced whether the
means are high tech, or as low tech as a garbage search or a po-
lice officer climbing a tree to peer in a second story bedroom
window. Perhaps, if I choose my friends and neighbors poorly
enough, someone will decide to go through my garbage, secretly
tape his conversations with me, even hover above my backyard
in a helicopter. The police, however, should not do so-at least
not without meeting the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
The focus on technology, and the general use limitation it
has spawned, deflect us from this crucial inquiry. I offer two
sets of reasons for this conclusion. First, the focus on technol-
ogy relies too heavily on an unduly narrow version of the
Framers' intent. Second, the general use requirement fails to
address the problems with technological advance in particular
and the Fourth Amendment more broadly because it will ulti-
mately diminish privacy, and because it does not adequately
address the issue of inequality.
First, I will turn to the problem with reliance on the Fram-
ers' intent. Professor Ku argues that the predominant Fourth
Amendment approach, which asks whether the means em-
(making the argument). But see id. at 35 n.2 (rejecting the argument).
39. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,457 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority's "exceedingly grudging Fourth Amendment [tiheory"
in the context of police helicopter surveillance because under the theory one's
expectation of privacy is defeated if a single member of the public could do the
same as the police no matter "the difficulty a person would have in so position-
ing, and however infrequently anyone would in fact do so").
1386 [Vol.86:1379
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ployed were similar to means that the Framers would consider
a search, is misguided.40 Ku's objection to the means inquiry is
that it permits courts to contract the degree of privacy "the
Founders would have enjoyed."41 His proposed solution is to
shift the power from the courts to juries and legislatures and to
require that one of these bodies authorize each new use of
technology.42 Although I agree with his conclusion that we
should not rely too heavily on what constituted a search at the
time of the Framers, and with his argument that doing so
would allow technology to drive the inquiry,43 I fear that his
reasoning and his proposed solution themselves place too much
reliance on a narrow version of the Framers' intent.
Why should we assume that the balance between security
and privacy that obtained at the time of the Framers ought to
guide us today? In one sense, this is another way of asking this
question: On what level of generality should the inquiry into
Framers' intent proceed?'4 Should we seek to address the
Framers' concern with rifling through papers in homes on the
authority of general warrants by focusing on the privacy con-
tent of papers, or the intrusion into homes, or the breadth of
warrants? Or should we address it on a more general level as a
concern with the unfettered use of government power? In part,
however, it is a different question: not what the Framers were
concerned with, but what balance the Fourth Amendment
ought to preserve today. As a practical matter, at a high level
of generality the questions might not seem that different. If,
for example, the Framers' intent is seen simply as providing
constraints against unfettered government power, this leaves
plenty of flexibility to flesh out the contours in light of current
concerns. Yet the difference is still significant. The very bal-
ance between liberty and security may shift over time. The
Fourth Amendment has means to accommodate such shifts, as
does the Constitution as a whole.
One such shift in values occurred at the time of the Recon-
struction-era amendments. These amendments make clear
that the concerns of the founders needed to be supplemented in
light of later concerns. If the Framers feared indiscriminate
40. Ku, supra note 1, at 1332.
41. Id. at 1363; see also id. at 1327-28.
42. Id. at 1373-77.
43. Id. at 1350.
44. See Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 366.
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searches on broad warrants, post-Reconstruction jurisprudence
needed to face the growing realization that discriminatory
searches, usually conducted without warrants, were equally de-
structive and pernicious. These concerns were addressed in
multiple ways, by both Congress and the courts: notably, in the
1960s through incorporation doctrine, new and reconceived ju-
risdictional rules, expanded habeas corpus, and changes in in-
terpretation and coverage of the first and fourth amendments,
among others. These changes worked in concert to advance
emerging notions of constitutional liberty.
Some might argue that this sea change was unique, but
this argument seems to be contradicted by, for example, cur-
rent events. Until this fall, there was substantial agreement
among scholars that we were living through the New Federal-
ism,45 another seismic shift of power-this time back to the
states. Since September 11th, this characterization has become
more complicated, and we are now witnessing new grants of
federal power for law enforcement, and more generally, a con-
ventional wisdom that says "the boundary between security
and liberty has shifted."46 We should debate whether this shift
ought to occur, and what it ought to mean for the Fourth
Amendment and the Constitution as a whole. The Framers
provide one important reference point in this debate-but they
cannot solve it.
For the same reasons, we can refer to the Framers' pre-
ferred solutions, but again, they provide no definitive yardstick
for measuring current day solutions. Ku's second, or "radical,"
thesis suggests that when police seek to use technologies that
are not yet in general use, their actions should be considered
reasonable only when authorized by statute. He argues that
this rule would ensure that the people determine the reason-
ableness of these new incursions into privacy. I note paren-
thetically that technology is often viewed solely as a source of
incursions into privacy. It is certainly conceivable, however,
that technology can offer greater protection of privacy. Con-
sider, for example, the privacy protection offered by automated
phone service replacing human operators, buzzer systems and
intercoms in apartment buildings, or, more recently, encryption
45. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federal-
ism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 832-33 (2001).
46. See, e.g., David E. Rovella, Pro-Police Opinions on the Rise, Poll Says,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 2002, at Al.
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technology. The Court, it is true, never seems to view technol-
ogy as a means to increase our subjective expectations of pri-
vacy,47 but it is not clear to me that we should view technology
as a one-way ratchet toward a police state. Nevertheless, I
agree with Ku that we need a way to reverse the Katz down-
ward spiral (the less privacy we have, the less we can expect"),
which places more and more police conduct outside the reach of
the Fourth Amendment.
My concern in this context is with Ku's argument that the
Framers' preference for juries over judges should today lead to
a preference for authorizing new types of search by statute.
Apart from the fact that the historical conclusion is quite con-
troversial, 49 its relevance for today needs to be evaluated inde-
pendently. Even if the colonists found juries to be in the best
position to protect their rights, in our more heterogeneous
times, judges may need to play a greater role in protecting mi-
nority interests.50 Ku is right to be concerned that the Fourth
Amendment now protects only isolated pockets of interest. It is
not clear, however, that either juries or legislatures are best
equipped to ensure that the protection extends to all people, in-
cluding the reviled and the powerless.
Finally, I turn to my second set of reasons for believing
that the general use rule will not help us properly define the
scope of the Fourth Amendment: This rule will ultimately di-
minish privacy, and it does not adequately address the issue of
inequality. Let me first turn to the privacy issue. Ku cites
with approval Justice Scalia's retort to Justice Stevens in Kyllo,
which was that Stevens' suggested focus on the means used
47. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979) (stating that
the petitioner had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers he di-
aled on his phone); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 2.7(b), at 506 (2d ed. 1987) (identify-
ing "the ominous proposition that modem technology cannot add to one's justi-
fied expectation of privacy, but can only detract from it"); Burkoff, supra note
10, at 540.
48. RICHARD H. SEAMION, KYLLO V. UNITED STATES AND THE PARTIAL
ASCENDANCE OF JUSTICE SCALIA's FOURTH AMENDmENT 18 (Wash. & Lee Pub.
L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-20, 2001).
49. See Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse
than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 21-25 (1994); Carol Steiker, Sober Sec-
ond Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 826-30 (1994);
Susan Bandes, "We the People" and Our Enduring Values, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1376, 1399-1402 (1998).
50. See Bandes, supra note 49, at 1399-1402.
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would "leave 'the homeowner at the mercy of advancing tech-
nology.' 51 Ku prefers Scalia's approach, which would require a
warrant for any use of technology "to enhance [the] senses."52
He argues that
[t]o the extent that flashlights, cameras, and binoculars are routinely
in general public use, we become as familiar with the threats they
pose as we have our natural senses. Likewise, we become as capable
of evaluating and responding to the technology's threat either with
privacy enhancing technology or by limiting its use by law.53
As Chris Slobogin points out, however, the general use doc-
trine affords us only the amount of privacy that is available
from the public at large, and as technology gets cheaper and
more widely used, that amount continues to shrink-until it
may swallow the prohibition on technological advancement en-
tirely.54 Scalia's approach is not well poised to reverse this
downward spiral.
The general use test is also ill-suited to safeguard equality.
Ku's argument in favor of the test is that it guarantees that
the public as a whole understands the risks and has borne the costs of
such technologies.... [Tiherefore, [it] reduces the risk that the public
will acquiesce to government use of technology because a majority or
powerful minority have not internalized the costs of such technology,
and therefore, either misperceive the relative costs and benefits or
selfishly are willing to allow others to pay them.55
This is an interesting argument. It falls prey, however, to
the trap of conflating what the public can do with what the po-
lice should do. The fact that a particular technology has en-
tered common use has little to do with whether, or how, the po-
lice should use it. Since the test does not focus on these
questions about the proper scope of government power, it is un-
able to address the abuse of that power-a question little corre-
lated with the sophistication of the technology at issue. Ensur-
ing that the burden is widespread is often the problem, rather
than the solution. As I noted above, it reduces our liberty and
51. Ku, supra note 1, at 1365 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 35-37 (2001)).
52. Id. As Ku recognizes, Scalia appears to have intended this approach
to extend only to searches of constitutionally protected areas, such as the
home. Id. at 1366-67; see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
53. Ku, supra note 1, at 1371.
54. Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amend-
ment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86
Minn. L. Rev. 1393 (2002).
55. Ku, supra note 1, at 1370.
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privacy from governmental intrusion across the board. Nor is
the move to indiscriminate searches successful at reducing dis-
criminatory searches.56 For example, luggage scans at the air-
port have become ubiquitous for the flying public, yet their very
ubiquity spawns the usual problems about use of pernicious cri-
teria to choose subjects for more thorough scans. When tech-
nology is in use, it does not operate on its own-it is operated
by fallible human beings who ought to be supervised. The
weight of their errors and prejudices rarely falls evenly over the
populace. This is a problem whether we deal with the low tech
Terry57 pat down or high tech thermal imaging-a technology
that is subject to interpretation and manipulation like any
other,58 and will remain so even when it enters "general use."
56. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995) (argu-
ing that widespread searches are less intrusive because they do not single out
individuals).
57. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing limited stops
of individuals based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and permit-
ting a limited frisk of the individual for weapons if the officer reasonably be-
lieves the suspect is armed and dangerous).
58. Kathleen A. Lomas, Bad Physics and Bad Law: A Review of the Con-
stitutionality of Thermal Imagery Surveillance After United States v. Elkins,
34 U.S.F. L. REV. 799, 801 (2000) (discussing ways in which thermal imaging
technology can be misinterpreted and manipulated).
20021 1391
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:13791392
